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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the impact of FDI on the labor share of income in developing countries. We
propose a theory that relates on the impacts of FDI on productive heterogeneity. We build on the idea
that FDI have two opposite e¤ects on the labor share: a negative force originated by market power
and technological advance, and a positive force due to increased labor market competition between rms.
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Then, we test this theory on aggregate panel data through xed e¤ect and system-GMM estimations. We
nd a (statistically meaningful) U-shaped relationship between the labor share in manufacturing sector
and the ratio of FDI stock to GDP. However, most of the countries are stuck in the decreasing part of
the curve, which we relate to multinationals location choices.
Labor shares have plunged over the past two/three decades in poor countries. Harrison (2002) for
instance estimates that developing countries have experienced a yearly 0.1 point decrease in labor share
from 1970 to 1993 and 0.3 point from 1993 to 1996. Meanwhile, developing countries have become
increasingly open to capital movements. Main-street people as well as world-famous economists suggest
that these two phenomena are deeply related. To quote Sachs (1998):
"For example, both evidence and theoretical logic make it quite clear that union wage premia
are driven down by the openness of the world nancial system and that the ability of capital
to move o¤shore really does pose limits on the wage-setting or wage-bargaining strategies of
trade unions which are restrained in their wage demands by the higher elasticity of labor
demand."
This borrows from Rodrik (1997) who explains that the current wave of globalization mainly increases
the relative mobility of capital vis-à-vis labor. This has received some support from recent papers that
examine how trade and capital account openness a¤ect the labor share of income1 . These papers mostly
underline the side e¤ects of globalization, casting doubt on the relevance of policies that advertise more
trade and nancial openness.
This paper makes four contributions. First, and most importantly, this provides a simple frictional
model of the labor market tailored to think about the impacts of FDI and nancial openness on the labor
share of income in the host country. Second, we argue that FDI can have negative e¤ects on the labor
share of income, even though foreign rms pay higher wages than local rms and FDI benet all the
workers. Third, we suggest that there should be a reversal in the relationship between FDI and the labor
share. At least, we claim that the labor share cost of FDI decreases with FDI level. Fourth, we examine
the relevance of the theory on aggregate data.
In the theoretical part of the paper, we present a two-sector static model in which local and foreign
rms coexist. Foreign rms are more productive than local rms2 , but they face higher entry costs. Such
entry costs for the foreign rms have two components. On the one hand, they parameterize the degree
of nancial openness. This component is related to the institutions that shape the attractiveness of the
country for the foreign investors. On the other hand, they capture opportunity costs of entry. Foreign
rms have alternative prot opportunities in the rest of the world.
1Ortega and Rodriguez (2002) argue that trade openness deteriorates the labor share of income in developing countries.
Diwan (2000, 2002) claims that exchange rate crises have a strong negative impact on the labor share. Harrison (2002),
and Jayadev and Lee (2005) show that capital controls tend to increase the labor share.
2Foreign rms are more productive than local rms for several reasons. First, foreign rms are likely to benet from
advanced technologies. Second, theoretical models of FDI like Helpman et al (2004) predict that only the most productive
rms become multinational companies. Third, foreign owners self-select into high-productivity sectors, and/or where they
have a comparative advantage. Fourth, foreign-owned rms have easier access to capital. The particular reason why foreign
rms are more productive does not matter.
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Sectors are perfectly symmetric and they both feature matching frictions. Workers search in both
sectors. If a worker receives a single o¤er, he is paid the monopsony wage. If he receives more than
one o¤er, potential employers enter Bertrand competition and the worker goes where the wage o¤er is
the highest. When a foreign rm and a local rm compete, the foreign rm wins the competition. The
worker is then paid at the marginal productivity he would have reached if he had been employed by the
local rm. When two foreign rms or two local rms compete, the worker obtains full marginal product.
There is a one-to-one decreasing relationship between the equilibrium proportion of foreign rms and
their entry costs. In turn, the proportion of foreign rms governs the degree of productive heterogeneity
between rms. Firms are very similar when foreign rms produce no output, and when they produce
most of output. Owing to market frictions, the labor share decreases with rm heterogeneity. We show
that there is a single value of the entry cost that foreign rms face above which a decrease in such a
cost reduces the labor share, and below which this raises the labor share. Therefore, the relationship
between foreign rmscost of entry and the labor share is U-shaped. The magnitude of the relationship
is governed by the technological gap between foreign and local rms.
In the empirical part of the paper, we estimate a linearized version of the model on aggregate panel
data. The dataset covers a large panel of countries whose GDP per capita was 60% or lower than US
GDP per capita in 1980. The dependent variable is the labor share in manufacturing sector, that is the
ratio of total wage bill to GDP produced in that sector. The variable that captures the magnitude of
foreign rmsactivity is the stock of inward FDI in percentage of GDP. One minus the ratio of local GDP
per capita to US GDP per capita is a proxy for the technological gap between local rms and foreign
rms. We typically explain the labor share by means of FDI stock to GDP, FDI stock to GDP squared,
proxy for technological gap, ratio of capital to output, unemployment rate, and time dummies. We rst
focus on xed e¤ects regressions, but we also discuss outliers, control for endogeneity and autocorrelation
bias with system-GMM estimates, and control for alternative measures of globalization. Our estimations
show a signicant U-shaped relationship between the labor share and FDI stock to GDP. The other
determinants of the labor share have the predicted sign: technological gap (-), unemployment rate (-),
capital to output ratio (0/+).
The threshold above which the labor share starts increasing with FDI is very high, typically 150-
180% of GDP. This means that FDI have decreased the labor share in most of the host countries of our
dataset. This casts some doubt on the ability of openness policies to attract FDI above the threshold.
One of the likely reasons suggested by our model is that opportunity costs matter a lot for foreign rms.
The countries above the threshold are Hong-Kong, Ireland, Macao, and Singapore. Those countries
experienced very high growth rates, and attracted enormous volumes of FDI. A thougthful government
may shape a high-quality institutional environment to please foreign investors; but the government cannot
reduce alternative prot opportunities in other countries.
Overall, the quantitative impact of FDI is substantially large. Consider a country that is characterized
by the mean value of FDI/Y and experiences an increase of one standard deviation in this ratio, everything
else equal. Our estimates imply a fall in the labor share that varies between 3.5 to 7 points. This impact
amounts between 7% to 22% of the mean labor share in our sample. FDI have substantially contributed
to falling labor shares in these countries.
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This paper relates to two strands of literature.
First, we contribute to the ongoing debate on the e¤ects of FDI on the factor distribution of output
in the host country. Most of the literature focuses on wage inequality (recent theoretical contributions
include Liang and Mai, 2003, Marjit et al, 2004, and Das, 2005), and displays mixed evidence in favor of
the thesis according to which FDI cause wage inequality, either at industry level3 or country level4 . By
contrast, we focus on the labor share. A decrease in labor share originated by FDI inows may indicate
that the overall benets accruing to globalization are captured by foreign investors, with unchanged
standard of living for the population. This is especially true when the host country fails to design the
scal tools to tax the benets made by rms nanced by foreign capital. FDI-induced falls in labor shares
in developing countries also strengthen the protectionist view according to which developed economies
should not trade with low-wage countries. These di¤erent e¤ects are likely to give political support
against FDI and the multinationals, both in developed and developing countries.
Second, this paper is related to the growing literature on globalization and labor market frictions.
This literature mostly focuses on trade liberalization. A rst strand of contributions incorporates match-
ing frictions in two-sector models of international trade (see Davidson et al, 1999, Moore and Ranjan,
2005, Davidson and Matusz, 2006a, 2006b). Another strand of contributions uses models of international
trade with rm heterogeneity (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2006, Davis and Harrigan, 2007, Helpman
and Itskhoki, 2007). Mitra and Ranjan (2007) analyze the impact of o¤shoring in the home economy,
while Davidson et al (2006) discuss the outsourcing of high-skill jobs. Our paper complements these
contributions in two ways. On the one hand, we are interested in the labor share rather than in unem-
ployment and wage dispersion/inequality. On the other hand, we focus on the host economy rather than
on the home country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model. Section 3 discusses ex-
tensions dealing with microeconomic implications, FDI learning, transfer pricing, technological transfers,
and capital choice. Section 4 contains the empirical part of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
The model is static. There are two nal goods entering preferences symmetrically. Each good is produced
within an autonomous sector. There are a continuum of workers normalized to one and a continuum of
rms. Workers are homogenous. Firms are not. Foreign rms di¤er from local rms. The labor market
is characterized by frictions. Matching frictions will parameterize the ability of people to generate wage
competition between potential employers.
3Feenstra and Hanson (1997) on Mexico, Figini and Görg (1999) on Ireland and Taylor and Dri¢ eld (2005) on the UK
nd a positive e¤ect of FDI on wage inequality, while Blonigen and Slaughter (2001) on the US do not nd any signicant
e¤ects.
4Tsai (1995) and Gopinath and Chen (2003) nd that FDI has increased wage inequality only in a subset of developing
countries, while Basu and Guariglia (2006) nd a more general relationship. Figini and Görg (2006) argue that the positive
e¤ect of FDI on wage inequality decreases with development.
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Each rm, foreign or local, is endowed with a single job slot. Foreign rms are more productive than
local rms: the amount of output produced by a foreign and a local rm are respectively yF and yR with
yF > yR. This reects the technological advance of foreign rms (so that total factor productivity is
higher), and/or their better access to the nancial market (so that capital intensity is higher).
Before searching for a worker and starting to produce, a rm has to pay the entry cost c > 0. This is
a shadow cost as in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). This assumption means that rms make pure prots.
If c was an actual cost, these prots would be dissipated in entry costs. The entry cost is proportional
to output and di¤ers according to the nationality of the owners. Hence, cF is the entry cost per unit of
output of a foreign rm, and cR stands for the entry cost of local rms. We assume that cF > cR.
The cost cR represents the local di¢ culties to set up a rm. This cost measures the formal and informal
di¢ culties to set up new businesses (product market regulations, knowledge of recruitment procedures
and network of potential employees) and that lead to higher rents. The cost cF has three components:
general di¢ culties to open a new business cR, imperfect nancial openness cO, and opportunity cost of
entry . Formally, cF = cR + cO + .
Imperfect nancial openness is associated to the existence of capital controls and restrictions on
international transactions for foreign investors. Foreign investors may also face higher administrative
costs (because they have to learn local regulations), or information costs (they have to learn how to
recruit their employees). Rising nancial openness translates into a lower cost cO  0. Opportunity
costs of entry result from multinationalsalternative location choices. These alternative locations o¤er
alternative rewards.
Workers and vacancies meet at the sector level according to the matching technologyMi =M (ui; ni).
Here, ui stands for the number of job-seekers in sector i and ni stands for the number of vacancies in the
same sector. The matching technology M is homogenous of degree one to ensure that the unemployment
rate does not depend on the number of traders in the economy. It is also strictly increasing in both
arguments, strictly concave, and bounded by min fui; nig. Workers search jobs in both sectors. Hence,
u1 = u2 = 1. Firms choose one sector before opening their vacancy. Given such assumptions, M (1; ni) =
m(ni) is the probability for a given worker to receive an o¤er from sector i. It is increasing in ni. Similarly,
m(ni)=ni is the probability for a rm to meet a worker. It is decreasing in ni.
Firms set wages. If a worker receives a unique o¤er, he is paid the monopsony wage. For simplicity, the
market value of outside opportunities is normalized to zero, and so is the monopsony wage. If a worker
receives two o¤ers, one from each sector, rms enter Bertrand competition to attach labor services.
Therefore, the model is static, but it features some of the properties of dynamic models with on-the-job
search.
To conclude this subsection, note that we introduce two symmetric sectors associated with two match-
ing markets as a trick to ensure that a worker either receives zero, or one, or two job o¤ers (coming from
the two sectors). This originates simple free-entry conditions, and this allows to highlight the roles played
by rm heterogeneity and matching frictions on the labor share of income. Alternatively, we could have
considered a single sector, while workers would have been endowed with two applications (see e.g. Al-
brecht et al, 2006). Assuming that workers cannot direct their applications towards foreign or local rms
would give very similar results.
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2.2 Labor market equilibrium
The model only admits symmetric equilibria. This has two implications. First, in equilibrium, prices
of the two goods are the same, and we normalize the common price to one. Second, the proportion of
foreign rms in the total number of rms is also the same in each sector. As a result, we can drop indices
i specic to sectors.
We rst consider wage determination. The probability that a worker receives a single job o¤er is
2m(n)(1 m(n)). Then, the wage is nil and the rm gets the whole output. The probability of receiving
two o¤ers ism (n)2. Then, the wage depends on the productivity of the two rms. Let  be the proportion
of foreign rms. With probability (1 )2, the two o¤ers emanate from local rms and the worker receives
output yR. With probability  (1  ), one of the o¤ers comes from a foreign rm, and the other comes
from a local rm. Then, the worker is hired by the foreign rm and his wage is yR. The rm gets the
di¤erence yF  yR. Finally, with probability 2, the two o¤ers come from foreign rms. Then, the worker
gets the marginal product yF .
Expected prots for the two types of rms are:
F =  cF yF + m (n)
n
[(1 m(n)) yF +m(n)(1  )(yF   yR)] (1)
R =  cRyR + m (n)
n
[1 m(n)] yR (2)
Firms enter the two sectors until prots cover the shadow costs. In equilibrium, R = F = 0.
cF =
m (n)
n

1 m(n) +m(n)(1  )yF   yR
yF

(3)
cR =
m (n)
n
[1 m(n)] (4)
These two equations simultaneously dene , the proportion of foreign rm in each sector, and n, the
total number of rms in each sector. The system can be solved recursively. The free-entry condition (4)
for the local rms determines the total number of rms n. Then, the free-entry condition (3) determines
the proportion of foreign rms . It is easy to check that cF > cR together with yF > yR imply that
there exists a unique equilibrium with a non-trivial proportion of foreign rms.
The reason why the total number of rms only depends on the e¤ective entry cost faced by local rms
is the following. If cF decreases, prots for foreign rms become positive. New foreign rms enter as
result. Since cR remains constant, prot expectations for local rms become negative as they nd more
di¢ cult to recruit a worker. The number of local rms goes down until the total number of rms goes
back to its initial value.
Foreign rmsentry cost is cF = cR + cO + . Therefore, rising nancial openness as well as falling
outside prot opportunities do not modify the total number of rms, but increase the proportion of
foreign rms applying the implicit function theorem to equations (3) and (4) shows that dn=dcF = 0
and d=dcF < 0. An increase in productivity gap (yF   yR) =yR has similar e¤ects to an increase in
nancial openness. This increases the proportion of foreign rms, but does not impact the total number
of rms.
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2.3 Labor share
The total wage bill paid by foreign rms is
WF = m (n)
2
 [yF + 2(1  )yR] (5)
The wage bill corresponds to workers who receive two o¤ers. This happens with probability m (n)2.
With probability 2 the two o¤ers are from foreign rms and the worker receives the totality of output
yR. With probability 2(1  ), one of the two o¤ers is from a local rm, and the worker gets yR.
The total wage bill paid by local rms is
WR = m (n)
2
(1  )2yR (6)
Wages correspond to workers who receive two o¤ers from local rms.
Total output in foreign rms is
YF = m (n)  [2 m (n) ] yF (7)
The probability that a worker does not receive a job o¤er from a foreign rm is (1 m (n) )2.
Therefore, the probability that a worker receives an o¤er from such rms is 1  (1 m (n) )2. However,
the worker may receive two o¤ers from such rms with probability m (n) 22. But, only one of the rms
hires him. Hence, we subtract m (n) 22. The result follows.
Similarly, total output in local rms is
YR = m (n) (1  ) [2 m (n) (1 + )] yR (8)
Total wage bill is W =WF +WR, while total output is Y = YF +YR. After simple algebra, we obtain
LS =
W
Y
=
m (n)

2yF + (1  2)yR

 [2 m (n) ] yF + (1  ) [2 m (n) (1 + )] yR (9)
2.4 Impact of foreign rms on the labor share
In this sub-section, we analyse how the labor share responds to changes in foreign rms entry cost.
First, entry costs only a¤ect the labor share through e¤ective changes in the proportion of foreign rms.
Second, there is a U-shaped relationship between the labor share and the proportion of foreign rms.
Finally, multinationalsopportunity costs of entry limit the e¤ectiveness of openness policies, and may
forbid the possibility to reach the increasing part of the curve.
The gap in entry costs paid by foreign and local rms is cF   cR = cO + . This gap depends
on the degree of nancial openness, which determines cO, and alternative prot opportunities, which
determine . According to the free-entry conditions (3) and (4), changes in either one or both of these
cost components only lead to changes in the proportion  of foreign rms in the total number of rms.
Therefore, to capture the impact of a decrease in foreign rmsentry cost, we only need to di¤erentiate
LS given by equation (9) with respect to . We obtain:
dLS
d
sign
=  dY=d LS+ dW=d
sign
=  (1  m (n)) (yF   yR)LS
technological gap e¤ect
+ m (n) (yF   yR)
wage competition e¤ect
(10)
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Two opposite forces are involved:
The technological gap e¤ect tends to decrease the labor share. An increase in the proportion of foreign
rms raises output, as they benet from better productivity. At given wage, this reduces the labor share.
This e¤ect depends on the ability of foreign rms to extract a rent on labor thanks to their better
technology.
The wage competition e¤ect tends to increase the labor share. An increase in the proportion of foreign
rms raises wage competition between them, which increases wages. At given output, this tends to raise
the labor share.
The impact of foreign rmsentry cost on the labor share results from the interplay between these
two forces. After simple algebra, we get:
dLS
d
sign
= 2yF   (1  )2yR (11)
Hence, dLS=d is non-monotonic in . It decreases at rst, reaches a minimum, and nally increases.
The technological rent e¤ect initially dominates, while it is dominated at larger proportion of foreign
rms. The threshold proportion of foreign rms  below (above) which increased nancial openness
deteriorates (raises) the labor share results from dLS=d = 0. We nd
 =
(yRyF )
1=2   yR
yF   yR (12)
The pattern of the labor share with respect to the proportion of foreign rms reects the pattern of
productive heterogeneity among rms. The labor share is the same when there are no foreign investors
(cF su¢ ciently large, which implies that  = 0), and when output is only produced by foreign rms
(cR = cF , which implies that  = 1). For these two extreme cases:
LS =
m(n)
2 m(n) (13)
Figure 1 depicts the U-shaped relationship between the proportion of foreign rms and the labor
share.
Increasing nancial openness or reducing outside prots means moving along the curve from the left
to the right. These variables only a¤ect the labor share to the extent they alter the proportion of foreign
rms. Financial openness has no impact per se. This prediction di¤ers from Rodrik-type models in which
the labor share decreases with institutional openness (see Harrison, 2002, for instance).
It is important to disentangle costs induced by imperfect nancial openness cO from opportunity costs
. Governments can alter the degree of nancial openness; however, they cannot reduce prot oppor-
tunities in alternative countries. The proportion of foreign rms easily responds to nancial openness
policies at early stages of nancial openess. It is, therefore, easy to go along the decreasing part of the
curve. However, opportunity costs of entry limit the ability of openness policies to reach the increasing
part of the curve. In Figure 1,  is the proportion of foreign rms implied by the entry cost cF = cR+ .
This constraint may be so tight that  is actually lower than .
In our empirical analysis, we will show that most of the developing countries are actually stuck on
the decreasing part of the locus. In line with the current discussion, we will argue that this is implied by
multinationalsalternative prot locations.
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Figure 1: Labor share and proportion of jobs in foreign rms. LS goes from 0 to 1 as cF goes from innity
to cR. The proportion  corresponds to cO = 0.
3 Extensions and discussions
This section discusses various aspects of our model. We start by examining changes in the labor share
between foreign and local rms. Then, we consider four extensions to our model: FDI learning, transfer
pricing, technological transfers, and capital choice.
3.1 Micro predictions
In this sub-section, we focus on wages in local and foreign rms. First, foreign rms pay higher wages
than local rms. Second, foreign rms may pay higher wages per unit of output, and originate a negative
wage externality on local rms.
The labor shares in foreign and local rms can be computed from equations (6), (8), (5) and (7). We
obtain:
LSR =
WR
YR
=
m (1  )
2 m (1 + ) (14)
LSF =
WF
YF
=
m
2 m
2 (1  ) yR + yF
yF
(15)
Average wage paid by type-i rms is wi =LSiyi, i = R;F . It follows that wF > m2 m (2  ) yR > wR.
Foreign rms pay better wages than local rms do. However, the labor share may either be higher or
lower in foreign rms. Here, two e¤ects compete. The rst e¤ect is intuitive: foreign rms are more
productive, which tends to decrease the labor share at given wage. However, they also pay better wages:
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each time a foreign and a local rm compete to attract a worker, the worker ends up being paid in the
foreign rm, while the job is destroyed in the local rm. For instance, when the proportion of foreign
rm is very low,   0, LSR  m= (2 m) and LSF  myR=yF . When the productivity di¤erential is
large, LSF <LSR as the former e¤ect suggests. When the productivity di¤erential is low, LSF >LSR.
It is easy to show that dLSR=d < 0. The labor share as well as the average wage paid by local
rms decreases with the proportion of foreign rms. Consider a worker contacted by a local rm. With
probability 1   m (n), he does not receive an alternative o¤er. In such a case, he works for his local
employer and receives the monopsony wage (0). With probability m (n), he receives an alternative o¤er.
With probability 1  , this o¤er comes from another local employer. In such a case, the worker is hired
by a local rm, and he is paid at marginal product yR. With probability , the o¤er comes from a foreign
employer. Then, the worker is hired by the foreign rm. To summarize, the probability of being hired by
a local rm is equal to 1 m (n)+m (n) (1  ) = 1 m (n) , while the probability of receiving marginal
product conditional on being recruited by a local rm is m (n) (1  ). The latter probability goes down
with foreign rmsproportion, which explains the declines in labor share and average wage in local rms.
Local rms cannot compete with foreign rms to attach labor services. Local rms that survive an
increase in the proportion of foreign rms are rms whose workers are more likely not to benet from any
other o¤er. Consider the case where the proportion of foreign rms is very large, i.e.   1. In that case,
either the worker does not receive an alternative o¤er, or he receives an o¤er from a foreign rm. In the
former case, he gets the monopsony wage in the local rm. In the latter case, he works in a foreign rm.
Hence, the only workers hired by local rms receive the monopsony wage and the labor share is minimal
in such rms (here, 0).
This result is in accordance with the empirical estimates of Aitken et al (1996). They explore the
impact of FDI on wages in Mexico, Venezuela and United States. They nd that FDI are associated
with higher wages. However, in Mexico and Venezuela, foreign investment has a negative impact on
the wage paid by domestic rms. This negative e¤ect is statistically signicant in Venezuela, while it
is not in Mexico. Aitken et al argue that this impact might be due to the fact that foreign rms select
the best workers, or to the fact that the entry of foreign investment has coincided with a decline in the
productivity of domestically owned plants. We tell another story that is based on matching frictions and
wage competition between potential employers.
In foreign rms,
dLSF =d
sign
= yF   (2 m) yR (16)
Hence, the labor share and the average wage paid by foreign rms can either decrease or increase with
the proportion of foreign rms. This increases whenever the productivity di¤erential between foreign and
local rms is su¢ ciently large, and/or the matching probability is su¢ ciently high. For instance, the
labor share increases with  when the labor market is perfectly competitive ( = 1).
3.2 Accounting for FDI learning
In this sub-section, we examine the argument according to which foreign rmsentry makes easier the
entry of new rms. This may give birth to multiple equilibria: low equilibria with few FDI, small output,
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but a high labor share, would coexist with equilibria with large FDI and high output, while the level
of the labor share would either be higher or lower. Interestingly, this assumption does not alter the
relationship between the labor share and the proportion of foreign rms.
We introduce FDI learning as follows: we assume that foreign rmsentry cost cF is decreasing in 
likely through the openness component co. The model is unchanged, but the free-entry equation that
denes the proportion of foreign rms. The equilibrium vector (; n) now solves:
cF () =
m (n)
n

1 m(n) +m(n)(1  )yF   yR
yF

(17)
cR =
m (n)
n
[1 m(n)] (18)
The total number of rms n remains the same: this only depends on local rmsentry cost cR. Foreign
rmsproportion is dened by equation (17). There is a multiplier e¤ect. Both the right-hand side and
the left-hand side of equation (17) are decreasing in . This e¤ect may originate multiple equilibria, with
same number of jobs, same unemployment rate, but di¤erent proportions of foreign rms. Equilibria
have the following properties. First, given that foreign rms are more productive, equilibria in which
foreign rmsproportion is high are also equilibria in which GDP per capita is high. Second, given that
the relationship between foreign rmsproportion and the labor share is unchanged, equilibria with a
high proportion of foreign rms may feature a higher or lower labor share than equilibria with a low
proportion of foreign rms.
This extension has a major implication. Two countries characterized by the same institutions in terms
of nancial openness may attract very di¤erent numbers of foreign rms. It means that de jure measures
of nancial openness may be poorly related to the labor share, while de facto measures of foreign capital
should be more accurate5 . In the empirical part of the paper, we mainly focus on such de facto measures,
even though some of our regressions also include an institutional measure of nancial openness among
the regressors.
3.3 Accounting for transfer pricing
In this sub-section, we introduce transfer pricing into our model, and examine how this alters the non-
monotonic relationship between nancial openness and the labor share. We show that either the rela-
tionship is qualitatively unchanged, or it is strictly increasing.
In our basic framework, we implicitly assume that rms cannot choose where to locate the value-
added. There exist lots of scal tools for a multinational rm to locate prots of its subsidiaries where
taxation is more protable. The most famous is probably the transfer pricing method. Consider the
following example. Suppose that a multinational owns a single subsidiary. The subsidiary sells 100 units
of an electronic component to the multinational. The price paid by the multinational is $10 each for
a cost of $5 each paid by the subsidiary. Using the component as input, the multinational produces
a nal consumption good which is sold $1500 to the consumers. There are no taxes on prots in the
5There is another argument that follows the same line. The entry cost cF also captures multinationalsopportunity cost
of entry. Outside prot opportunities can change drastically even though country-specic nancial openness is unchanged.
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multinational country of origin whereas those taxes are about 50% in the subsidiarys country. So, after-
tax multinational prot is $500, while after-tax subsidiary prot is $250. Hence, total prot is $750.
Changing the price of the component, the multinational can increase its total prot. For instance, if
component had been sold $5, the total benet would have been $1000. Firms transfer the surplus where
taxes are low by changing the transfer price of intra-rm trade.
There are legal limits to transfer pricing, which is considered as scal escape. In developing countries,
local authorities do not want to lose scal takings. In developed countries, custom o¢ cers do not want
to lose part of tax receipts due to tari¤s on international trade. Custom o¢ cers are in charge to verify
that intra-rm trade is achieved at market prices6 . However, countries di¤er in how much they enforce
transfer pricing rules, and there is evidence of transfer price manipulation (see Hines, 1997, 1999).
If multinationals use transfer pricing to make prot of their subsidiaries lower, our story may not work
any longer. Consider the case of a multinational that opens a subsidiary in a developing country very
closed to foreign investments. In our story, output increases by a lot, but wages do not change very much.
Hence the labor share goes down. However, if the multinational locates its prots in another country
through transfer pricing, the labor share increases, because most of registered production achieved by
the subsidiary corresponds to wage payments7 .
Our framework must be enriched to account for prot shifting. We assume that foreign rms can
locate a proportion 1   of their prots in another country. The model is unchanged, but the denition
of output produced by foreign rms. Indeed, the value-added located within the country corresponds to
the wage bill plus the share  of the prots:
YF = m(n)
22yF + 2m(n)
2(1  ) [yR + (yF   yR)] + 2m(n)(1 m(n))yF ] (19)
After simplication, the labor share is worth:
LS =
m(n)

2yF + (1  2)yR

(1  ) [2 m(n)(1 + ) + 2m(n)(1  )] yR +  [2 m(n)(2  1)] yF (20)
When the country is closed (i.e. cF is su¢ ciently large so that there are only local rms and  = 0),
we have the same result as before:
LSj=0 =
m(n)
2 m(n) (21)
When the country is perfectly open (i.e. cF = cR so that there are only foreign rms and  = 1), the
labor share becomes:
LSj=1 =
m(n)
m(n) + 2(1 m(n)) > LSj=0 (22)
Hence, the labor share should be larger when the economy is perfectly open than when it is perfectly
closed. More generally, transfer-pricing reduces the size of the technological rent e¤ect. This does not
6 In case of homogeneous goods, the transfer price can be compared easily to the world market price. Controls are more
di¢ cult when the good is very di¤erentiated from competitors. There are two methods in this case. First, if a rm sells the
same good to several other rms in the same multinational structure, the transfer price must be the same for all rms. The
second method is to apply a mark-up on average cost to dene a theoretical transfer price.
7Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) make use of this fact to evaluate the response of prot shifting to changes in corporate
taxes in OECD countries.
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Figure 2: Labor share and proportion of jobs in foreign rms  the role of transfer pricing. Transfer
pricing decreases with . As far as  < , the relationship is strictly increasing.
alter the qualitative relationship between LS and the proportion of foreign rms unless multinationals
manage to relocate their prots massively. In such a case, LS strictly increases with nancial openness.
Figure 2 depicts the relationship between LS and the proportion of foreign rms as  increases.
The relationship is U-shaped if and only if
 >
1 m(n)
(yF   yR) =yR + 1 m (n)   (23)
This condition is satised when the productivity di¤erential (yF   yR) =yR between foreign and local
rms is large.
The main message of this extension is that prot shifting cannot articially create a negative or U-
shaped relationship between nancial openness and the LS. In the empirical part of the paper, we nd
such a U-shaped relationship, which, therefore, cannot be due to transfer pricing.
3.4 Accounting for technological transfers
In this sub-section, we introduce technological transfers from foreign to local rms and examine how they
alter the relationship between the proportion of foreign rmsentry cost and the labor share. As far as
foreign rms have positive spillover e¤ects on local rms, the technological rent e¤ect tends to decrease
with the size of the spillover e¤ect.
We assume that output produced by local rms depends on the proportion  of foreign rms, i.e.
yR = yR (). The spillover may be either positive in case of technological transfers or negative in
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case foreign rms reduce the ability of local rms to attract local investors, or destroy the network of
connections that local rms have8 .
A positive spillover has a stabilizing e¤ect. An increase in the proportion of foreign rms reduces
the technological gap between foreign and local rms. Foreign rms must pay a higher wage as a result,
which reduces the incentives to further invest in the country. A negative spillover has a multiplier e¤ect.
An increase in the proportion of foreign rms raises the technological gap. Wages go down in foreign
rms. This attracts new foreign investors. When this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, there maybe multiple
equilibria: equilibria with a large number of foreign rms and low wages, and equilibria with a low number
of foreign rms and high wages.
As far as there exists a unique equilibrium, a decrease in entry cost cF raises the proportion of foreign
rms. We can still study the derivative of the labor share with respect to such a proportion:
dLS
d
sign
=  @Y@  LS+ @W@ +

  @Y@yR  LS+ @W@yR

y0R ()
sign
=  (1  m (n)) (yF   yR)LS
technological gap e¤ect
+ m (n) (yF   yR)
wage competition e¤ect
+ (1  ) fm (1 + )  [2 m (1 + )]LSg y0R ()
technological transfer e¤ect
(24)
As LS< m (n) = (2 m (n)), the technological transfer e¤ect has the sign of y0R (). The sign as well as
the size of the technological transfer e¤ect depends on the sign and magnitude of the spillover. When
the spillover is positive, the technological transfer e¤ect tends to reduce the technological gap e¤ect.
Conversely, when the spillover e¤ect is negative, the technological transfer e¤ect tends to magnify the
technological gap e¤ect.
This extension delivers a major lesson. If one wants to capture the relationship between the proportion
of foreign rms and the labor share, one should also control for the technological di¤erential between
foreign and local rms.
3.5 Accounting for capital choice
Our basic model abstracts from capital choice. In this sub-section, we allow rms to set their capital
intensity. We also make the di¤erence between foreign and local rms, which may face di¤erent capital
costs. Provided that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower than one, a decrease
in foreign rmsentry cost can raise the labor share by increasing average capital intensity.
Let k denote capital intensity, and assume that output is y (k), with y (0) = 0, y0 (k) > 0, and
y00 (k) < 0. The elasticity of output with respect to capital intensity is  (k)  ky0 (k) =y (k) 2 (0; 1).
The rental cost of capital is asymmetric. Local rms face the price rR, while foreign rms face the price
rF  rR. To simplify, capital investment is made once the worker is recruited.
Capital intensity results from the equality between marginal productivity and marginal cost of capital:
y0 (ki) = ri, i = F;R
8See Blomström and Kokko (2003) for a survey of the empirical evidence. They conclude that spillovers of foreign
technology and skills to local industry is not an automatic consequence of foreign investment. Harrison and McMillan
(2003) for instance show that foreign rms crowd local rms out of domestic capital market in Ivory Coast.
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This implies that foreign rms are more productive than local rms, simply because the former can
invest at lower marginal cost than the latter. The labor share is:
LS =
m(n)

2 (1  F ) yF +
 
1  2 (1  R) yR
 [2 m(n)] yF + (1  ) [2 m(n)(1 + )] yR (25)
where yi = y (ki), and i =  (ki), i = F;R. As rR tends to rF , foreign and local rms are no longer
di¤erent, and the labor share tends to
LS = (1   (k)) m(n)
2 m(n) (26)
The labor share is composed of two terms, of which the rst is the elasticity of output with respect to
labor, and the second accounts for monopsony power derived from search frictions. As m (n) ! 1, the
second term tends to one and we are back to the competitive model.
A marginal increase in  induced by a marginal decline in cF has the following impacts:
dLS
d
sign
=  (1  m (n)) (yF   yR)LS
technological gap e¤ect
+ m (n) [(1  F ) yF   (1  R) yR]
wage competition e¤ect
(27)
The wage competition e¤ect now depends on the competitive wage di¤erential (1  F ) yF (1  R) yR,
rather than on the output di¤erential yF   yR. Given that kF > kR, we have R > F whenever the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower than one. The wage competition e¤ect is
magnied when capital and labor are complementary. This point has important implications for the em-
pirical analysis. In the empirical part of the paper (next section), changes in  are captured by changes
in FDI stock to GDP ratio. This means that changes in  and changes in total capital held by foreign
rms are observationally equivalent. This may induce a spurious positive impact of FDI stock to GDP
ratio on the labor share: an increase in such a ratio may simply raise aggregate capital intensity. It
follows that one must control for changes in aggregate capital intensity while trying to nd an empirical
relationship between the proportion of foreign rms and the labor share. In the empirical part of the
paper, regressions include a proxy for capital intensity.
3.6 From the theory to the empirical analysis
The theoretical model explains the labor share of income as a function of exogenous parameters, among
which the degree of nancial openness, foreign rmsopportunity cost of entry, and the cost to set up
jobs. However, these parameters only a¤ect the labor share because they have an impact on endogenous
variables like the vacancy/unemployment ratio, or the proportion of jobs in foreign rms. Formally, the
labor share is a function LS(;m (n) ; k; ) where   is a set of exogenous parameters. Our empirical
analysis consists in estimating a linearized version of this equation, allowing for a quadratic impact of
the variable .
4 Empirical analysis
This section examines the relationship between the size of economic activity due to foreign rms and
the labor share. We use panel data covering developing countries. Fixed e¤ects estimations show that
15
the stock of inward FDI to GDP has a non-monotonic impact on the labor share: decreasing at rst,
and then increasing. The threshold above which the labor share starts increasing with FDI is in the
range 150-180%. Most of the countries are stuck in the decreasing part of the curve. This relationship
appears robust to the consideration of outliers, to endogeneity and autocorrelation problems, and to
the introduction of globalization variables. The other determinants of the labor share are in line with
the theoretical model, especially the technological gap (-), unemployment rate (-), and capital intensity
(weakly +).
4.1 Data
The data set covers 94 developing countries over the period 1980-2000. We consider all available countries
whose GDP per capita was lower than 60% of the US one in 1980. Our preferred estimates are achieved
on yearly data to keep the maximum number of observations. The number of observations depends on the
number of variables included in the regression. The basic regression with country xed e¤ects, FDI stock
and a proxy for the technological gap is run over 1189 observations. Adding controls and instrumenting
some of the explicatives lower the number of observations according to data availability. Data sources
are detailed in the Appendix.
The dependent variable is the labor share. Following Ortega and Rodriguez (2002), and Daudey
(2005), we compute it from the UNIDO dataset. This dataset only covers the manufacturing sector.
The data are collected through a survey in more than 180 countries and cover a period from 1963 to
2003 (with gap). There are several reasons why we use the UNIDO dataset. First, UNIDO harmonizes
data denitions and computations across countries. Second, this dataset allows to abstract from changes
in the sectorial composition of output. Third, the UNIDO dataset minors the measurement problems
associated with self-employment9 . There are very few self-employed workers in the manufacturing sector.
Furthermore, there is a cut-o¤ concerning the number of employees under which the rm is excluded from
the survey. The main drawback of this variable is that wages do not include employerscontributions.
This tends to underestimate the labor shares. This problem is not very serious for our purpose, because
we do not proceed to international comparisons. All our estimates include country xed e¤ects. Fixed
e¤ects models use within country variations to estimate the desired parameters. However, there may be
changes over time in the labor shares that are only driven by changes in employerscontribution rates.
Part of these changes will be captured by time dummies and by a variable that is highly correlated to
GDP per capita.
The key explicative variable is the proportion of foreign rms. We use two di¤erent proxies: the ratio
of (inward) FDI stock to GDP (FDI/Y), and the ratio of FDI stock to total capital stock (FDI/K). The
former ratio is available from UNCTAD for 200 countries over the period 1980-2005. The latter ratio is
computed from UNCTAD data on FDI stock and from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005) for the capital
stock. FDI refers to equity participation over 10%. Such investments indicate that foreign investors play
9The labor share is the ratio of wage bill to value-added. The self-employed contribute to the denominator, but typically
do not appear in the denominator. There are several ways to impute a ctious wage to the self-employed (see Bernanke and
Gürkayanak, 2001, and Gollin, 2002). These methods require strong assumptions on such a ctious wage, as well as data on
self-employment. Focusing on the manufacturing sector does not require to manipulate the gross wage bill to output ratio.
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an active role in the management of the rm. These rms are more likely to benet from technological
advance. Of course, other rms may also benet from foreign investment. The presumption here is that
the percentage of jobs concerned by our analysis is highly correlated with the ratio of FDI stock to GDP
and/or the ratio of FDI stock to capital.
Stocks are computed from the historical record of FDI inows given by the balance of payments.
Capital account data have been criticized recently on the ground that they fail to account for the valuation
e¤ect10 . We also use data on FDI stocks provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), which correct for
the valuation e¤ect. These data are available over the longer period 1970-2005 and allow us to test the
robustness of our results.
The theoretical model suggests that the impact of FDI on the labor share depends on the technological
gap TG= (yF   yR) =yF between the host economy which receives FDI and the home-based transnational
rm. Unfortunately, there are no statistics for the mean productivity di¤erential yR=yF between local and
foreign rms. As a proxy for this variable, we use the ratio of local GDP per capita to US GDP per capita,
both measured at purchasing power parity. The technological gap variable is measured accordingly by
one minus the latter ratio.
The labor share also depends on the matching probability m (n). This probability shapes workers
ability to generate wage competition for their services. This probability is not available as such. However,
we use the following property of our model. The probability of staying unemployed coincides with the
unemployment rate. It is equal to UNR= (1 m (n))2. Therefore, we use the unemployment rate as a
proxy for (one minus) the matching probability. This variable is available for a limited number of years
and countries.
Finally, we must separate the impact of FDI from changes in overall capital intensity, as discussed
in subsection 3.5. We consider the ratio of capital stock to output K/Y rather than the ratio of capital
stock to labor. The former ratio is governed by changes in the ratio of capital stock to e¤ective units
of labor. Unfortunately, the UNIDO dataset does not allow us to compute a reliable capital stock series
 in many cases, the number of observations is clearly insu¢ cient. Therefore, we use the ratio I/Y of
investment to value added. We perform sensitivity regressions with the overall capital to output ratio.
Some regressions include a measure of trade openness (OPENT, the usual openness degree, that is
the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP), a measure of de jure capital account openness (OPENK) (the
composite index constructed by Chinn and Ito, 2006), a dummy variable (CRISIS) that takes the value
1 when the exchange rate falls by more than 25%.
Descriptive statistics for the core variables used in our regressions are shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
4.2 Core regressions
Let i denote the country and t the period. We aim to estimate the following xed e¤ects model:
LSit = a0i + a
1
t + a
2FDI/Yit + a
3 (FDI/Yit)
2
+ a4TGit + a5UNRit + a6K/Yit + "it (28)
10When a country is indebted in foreign money (dollars), changes in parity alter the debt level. This phenomenon is very
large for the US.
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where a0i is the country xed e¤ect, and a
t
1 is a period dummy. The error term "it is supposed serially
uncorrelated. The validation of our model requires that a2 < 0, a3 > 0, a4 < 0, a5 < 0. This statistical
model assumes that the di¤erent regressors have the same impact in each country. In particular, the
relationship between nancial openness and the labor share must be the same throughout the sample.
This prediction di¤ers a bit from the theoretical model, whereby the magnitude of the relationship depends
on output gap. We also present regressions in which the variable FDI/Y is replaced by the interaction
term FDI/YTG.
Table 2 depicts our main results. Each column is associated to a particular specication. In column
a, we estimate the relationship without controlling for capital intensity (this assumes a Cobb-Douglas
technology), unemployment rate and time dummies. In column b, we add time dummies. In column
c, we include capital intensity (this allows for CES technologies for instance). In column d, we add the
unemployment rate and lose half the observations. In columns e and f, we replace the regressor FDI/Y
by an interaction term between FDI/Y and technological gap. In columns b to f, regressors are one-period
lagged. This allows to control for potential contemporeanous correlation between the regressors and the
error term. Squared errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity between countries.
TABLE 2
The results can be commented along ve dimensions.
First, the estimations validate the existence of a U-shaped relationship between FDI/Y and the labor
share. The coe¢ cient associated to FDI/Y is negative, while the coe¢ cient associated to FDI/Y2 is
positive. This relationship is robust to country xed e¤ects, time dummies, and to our di¤erent control
variables. FDI have two opposite e¤ects on the labor share, in line with our theoretical model. Our
estimates also imply that the threshold above which an increase in FDI stock to GDP starts increasing
the labor share is very high. This threshold can be computed as follows:  a2=  2a3. It varies between
150% and 180%. This is far above the mean ratio in developing countries.
Second, the quantitative impact of FDI is substantially large. Consider a country that is characterized
by the mean value of FDI/Y (given by Table 1) and experiences an increase of one standard deviation
in this ratio, everything else equal. Estimates in columns a to d imply a fall in the labor share that
varies between 3.5 to 7 points. This impact amounts between 11% to 22% of the mean labor share of our
sample.
Third, the two other variables that our model emphasizes have the predicted negative impact. In
columns a to d, the technological gap (TG) has a negative sign, in line with the argument whereby
foreign rms use their technological advance to derive extra rents on the labor market. Consider a
country that experiences a decline in technological gap of one standard deviation. The labor share should
increase by 1.5 to 5.5 points. However, TG is highly correlated to GDP per capita, which means that
TG captures a variety of factors that are embodied in GDP per capita. The unemployment rate (UNR)
has a strong negative impact on the labor share.
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Fourth, the parameter associated to capital intensity (K/Y) has a positive sign yet it is not always
signicant. This indicates that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is lower than one.
The fact that capital and labor are complementary in output is not controversial, at least in developing
countries (see for instance Du¤y and Papageorgiou, 2000).
Fifth, Table 2 displays strong interaction e¤ects between FDI/Y and TG. Columns e and f show
that TG loses signicance and impact once we replace the regressor FDI/Y by the interaction term
FDI/YTG, and the regressor FDI/Y2 by (FDI/Y2)TG. This has two implications. On the one hand,
the technological gap mainly a¤ects the labor share through magnifying the e¤ects of FDI/Y. This is
in line with the theoretical model and strengthens the view according to which the technological gap
variable is more than a simple proxy for time-varying country-specic features that are correlated with
GDP per capita. On the other hand, the magnitude of the relationship between FDI and the labor share
is conditional on TG. The higher the technological gap, the larger the impact of foreign rms on the labor
share. Note that these estimates do not invalidate the magnitude of the e¤ects reported in columns a to d.
For instance, consider a country characterized by the mean technological gap and the mean ratio FDI/Y,
and assume that this country experiences an increase in FDI/Y of one standard deviation. According to
columns e and f, this would reduce the labor share by 7 to 10 points.
4.3 Understanding the results
In this sub-section, we check the robustness of the relationship between FDI stock to GDP and the
labor share. There are three main reasons why this statistical relationship may be spurious: existence
of outliers, endogeneity and autocorrelation biases, and omitted globalization variables that causes both
FDI and the labor share.
We rst start with outliers. Figure 3 plots the partial relationship between the labor share and the
ratio of FDI stock to GDP.11 This displays two main features. First, there are some outliers, but they do
not seem to drive the global negative impact of FDI. Second, Figure 3 visually conrms that most of the
sample is below the threshold. The at and increasing parts of the curve are due to a very few countries.
The countries that drive the positive part of the curve are Hong-Kong, Ireland, Macao, and Singapore.
These countries have two characteristics: they have experienced impressive growth rates over the period,
and they have attracted enormous amounts of FDI. These two features are related. High growth rates
imply high prot opportunities for the multinationals and foreign investors in general. In terms of our
model, the e¤ective cost of entry cF is very low in these countries, not only because of nancial openness
cO, but also because alternative prots  are relatively low. Conversely, e¤ective costs of entry are
very large in the other countries despite nancial openness, because oppportunity costs of entry are very
high. Put otherwise, FDI lower the labor shares throughout the developing world because most of the
FDI have been captured by booming countries in East-Asia and Europe. In terms of economic policy,
multinationalsopportunity cost of entry limits the e¤ectiveness of policies designed to attract FDI.
11Actually, the Figure as well as estimates displayed by Table 2 excludes three observations that were clear outliers:
Salvador in 1997, when the labor share goes from 26 to 81 before going back to 31; Israel in 1986, when the labor share
goes from 58 to 39 before reaching 63; Macedonia in when the labor share goes from 48 to 81 and then to 82. Of course,
estimating the model with these observations marginally a¤ects the coe¢ cients and their squared errors.
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LS = -0.230FDI/Y + 0.00065(FDI/Y)²
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Figure 3: Partial relationship between labor share and FDI stock to GDP. Country-specic controls are
TG, I/Y, time e¤ects, and country xed e¤ects.
To conrm that view, we run the regressions over various alterations of the initial sample. Table 3
displays the results. We rst compute the empirical distribution of percentage change in LS (LSit/LSit).
Then, we omit the observations belonging to the top 5 and top 10 percentile of this distribution, and run
xed e¤ects regressions. The results are reported in columns a and b. The magnitude of the relationship
between FDI/Y and LS is slightly reduced, but still signicant. Columns c and d omit observations where
the FDI stock to GDP is larger than 100% and 75% respectively12 . As expected, these regressions fail to
identify the positive part of the curve. Column e restricts the sample to countries whose GDP per capita
was lower than 50% of the US one in 1980. The results are very similar to the initial estimates.
TABLE 3
We then discuss endogeneity and autocorrelation biases.
Endogeneity may arise for two reasons. On the one hand, the regressors may be correlated with
the error terms in the xed e¤ects model. The explicative variables and the labor share are general
equilibrium variables. As such, they may be a¤ected by correlated shocks, generating a statistical bias in
the xed e¤ects estimator. Regressions displayed in Table 2 and Table 3 address this potential endogeneity
bias by considering lagged regressors. This method is based on the idea that the regressors are strongly
autoregressive, so that we do not lose too much information. The main advantage is that we do not
12We have also run regressions omitting the countries where such extreme changes have occured. The results are very
similar.
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lose many observations, and we do not bias the sample towards richer countries. On the other hand, the
labor share may directly alter FDI incentives for reasons that our model leaves apart. For instance, a
high labor share may mean a very good social climate, which lowers investment risk and attracts foreign
investors. If this relationship were true, the negative impact of FDI would be underestimated, while the
increasing part of the curve would reect the causal e¤ect of the labor share on FDI. This type of bias
cannot be addressed by lagging the regressors, because the lagged regressors would also be correlated
with the error terms.
Autocorrelation is a serious problem with panel data. Table 2 accounts for heteroskedasticity, but
not for autocorrelation. Dealing with autocorrelation requires to add the lagged labor share to the set
of regressors. However, the xed-e¤ect estimator is biased in nite samples because the residuals are
correlated with the new regressor. The size of the bias is typically magnied in small-T-large-N panel
datasets as ours.
To address these two sources of bias, we use the system-GMM estimator due to Blundell and Bond
(1998). This estimator reveals more stable to sample and instrument alterations than the Arellano-Bond
di¤erence estimator. Formally, the model is written as follows:
LSit = a1LSit 1 + a2FDI/Yit + a
3(FDI/Yit)
2
+ a4TGit + a6K/Yit +"it (29)
LSit = a1LSit 1 + a2FDI/Yit + a
3 (FDI/Yit)
2
+ a4TGit + a6K/Yit + "it (30)
where all the variables have been centered in their period mean to account for common period shocks.
The model has two components: the di¤erence and level submodels. In both components, the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the error terms and must be instrumented. In addition, FDI
terms may also be weakly exogenous, which also requires an instrumenting strategy. In the lack of good
instruments, the set of instruments only contains lagged endogenous regressors and exogenous variables.
In the di¤erence submodel, the di¤erenced lagged labor share is instrumented by past levels of the labor
share (from LSit 2), while the lagged labor share is instrumented by past di¤erences of the labor share
in the level submodel (from LSit 1). This generates a large number of instruments in GMM-style. The
set of instruments is nally reduced by collapsing the matrix of GMM-style instruments13 .
The model is estimated by two-step GMM, while reported squared errors feature Windmeijer correc-
tion. This method corrects for individual heteroskedasticity, arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within
individuals, and downward squared-error bias in nite sample.
TABLE 4
Table 4 reports the results. In columns a to e, FDI/Y and FDI/Y2 are presumed weakly exogenous,
i.e. FDI/Yit is correlated with "it. The regressors FDI/Yit and (FDI/Yit)
2 are instrumented by
FDI/Yit 2 and
 
FDI/Yit 2
2
in the di¤erence equation, while the regressors FDI/Yit and (FDI/Yit)
2
13The number of instruments increases with the time index of each observation. The total number of instruments is
quadratic in the number of periods as a result. Collapsing allows to reduce such a number, while exploiting the same
information displayed by the dataset (see Roodman, 2006).
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are instrumented by FDI/Yit 1 and 
 
FDI/Yit 1
2
in the level equation. In columns f and g, FDI/Y
and FDI/Y2 are presumed predetermined. The various regressors containing FDI/Yit are replaced by
their rst lags  like in the xed e¤ects regressions. However, they may be correlated with "it 1, and
still need to be instrumented (for the same reason LSit 1 needs to be instrumented). The instruments
are the same as in the case where FDI/Yit and (FDI/Yit)
2 are weakly exogenous.
The various columns di¤er in the number of lags that we consider for the various endogenous variables.
The number of instruments goes from 69 to 12. Clearly, 69 is too much with respect to the number of
countries, 61. Column h displays the results of a standard xed e¤ects regression, where we restrict the
sample to the one e¤ectively used by system-GMM estimations.
The results are remarkably consistent across the various system-GMM estimations. Parameter a1 is
about 0.65, which is lower than a unit root, but su¢ ciently high to prefer the system-GMM estimator
rather than the di¤erence estimator. Specication tests like the Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentifying
restrictions, and the Arellano-Bover test of second-order autocorrelation, suggest that the model is well
specied most of the times. This leads us to prefer the estimates with the smallest number of instruments,
and in particular the one where FDI/Y and FDI/Y2 are predetermined14 . The estimated relationship
between LS and FDI/Y is qualitatively similar to the one displayed by Table 2. Quantitatively, the
magnitude of the parameters associated to FDI variables is in the range 50-75% of the initial one. This
may receive three intrepretations. First, we lose more than 60 observations, and selection bias may lead
to a di¤erent estimation. Our model predicts that the threshold and the magnitude of the relationship
should be governed by the technological gap. If the selected sample is richer than the initial sample, FDI
have a smaller e¤ect on the labor share as the typical productivity di¤erential between foreign and local
rms is lower. The xed e¤ects regression shows that the relationship between FDI/Y and LS is 10%
smaller than the initial one. Second, endogeneity a¤ects both the decreasing and increasing parts of the
curve. Once purged from endogeneity bias, the true relationship reveals more modest by 10-40%. Third,
the statistical method itself may weaken the relationship. For those reasons, we interpret the GMM
ndings as a lower bound on the magnitude of the true relationship between FDI and the labor share.
Finally, we discuss other globalization variables. They have received some attention in the recent past,
and they may be correlated with both FDI and the labor share. Table 5 introduces a new set of regressors
that deal with these various aspects of globalization: institutional nancial openness, international trade,
and, following Diwan (2000, 2002), exchange rate crises.
TABLE 5
Table 5 shows that globalization variables do not a¤ect the relationship between FDI and the labor
share. In particular, institutional nancial openness does not lower the labor share. The variable OPENK
is Chinn and Ito (2006) index of nancial openness. Other studies (see Harrison, 2002, Ortega and
Rodriguez, 2002, Lee and Jayadev, 2005) point out that capital account openness can deteriorate the labor
share through increased capital mobility, thereby improving the bargaining position of capital owners. In
14Column g shows that the P-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is 0.953. This is obtained with a
remarkably low number of instruments, which suggests that this value does not su¤er from upward bias.
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line with such a theory, they report positive impacts of capital controls. Our model suggests that such
e¤ects of capital openness should disappear once we account for actual changes in foreign capital stocks.
Indeed, column b displays a positive coe¢ cient for the index of capital openness. Our model does not
predict anything regarding trade ows. However, trade ows are associated to multinationals. Therefore,
it is di¢ cult to disentangle the impact of trade from the impact of foreign rms. Harrison (2002) and
Ortega and Rodriguez (2002) estimate a negative e¤ect of trade on the labor share in developing countries.
However, Harrison considers FDI ows (rather than stocks as we do), and Ortega and Rodriguez do not
control for FDI variables. Table 5 displays a non-signicant parameter.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this sub-section, we further investigate the robustness of our results. We proceed in four steps. First,
we consider various denitions of the FDI variable. Second, we extend our dataset to richer countries,
and we consider the ratio of aggregate capital stock to output as a proxy for capital intensity. Third,
we estimate our model on 4-year mean data rather than yearly data, we estimate a probit version of the
regression, and we perform cluster estimates of the coe¢ cients.
In Table 6, we consider several alterations in the main explicative variable, i.e. the ratio of FDI stock
to GDP. Column a reproduces our benchmark regression: FDI stock is from UNCTAD, and it is divided
by GDP. In column b, FDI stock is from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) hereafter LMF. In column c
and d, the two FDI stock variables are divided by the total capital stock rather than GDP. Results are
qualitatively unchanged: all the di¤erent parameters have the same sign and signicance.
TABLE 6
Tables 7a to 8b show di¤erent sensitivity tests. In Tables 7a and 8a, the regressions do not include
the unemployment rate, while it is included in Tables 7b and 8b.
TABLE 7a
TABLE 7b
In columns a and b of each Table, regressions are run on developed rather than developing countries.
We have included the countries whose technological gap was below 40% in 1980. There is no relationship
between FDI and the labor share as a result. Interestingly, trade openness has a negative impact, as
suggested by the HOS theory of international trade.
Columns c and d consider 4-year mean data rather than yearly data. Such regressions are not very
meaningful, given the very low number of countries and observations  this especially true when we
include the unemployment rate among the regressors. However, the P-values of the estimated parameters
associated to FDI/Y and FDI/Y2 are surprisingly high. Consistent with this, regressions, not reported
here, have been run on 2-year and 3-year averages: the magnitude of parameters is unchanged, while
signicance increases.
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Columns e and f consider a probit transformation of the labor share variable15 . Although such a
transformation cannot be derived from linearizing the theoretical model, this allows to test whether the
U-shaped relationship only captures some convexity or not. Results are very similar to the baseline
regressions (in particular, the threshold above which the labor share starts increasing with FDI/Y is
virtually unchanged).
Columns g to j show cluster estimates. Clustering allows a particular form of heteroskedasticity that
can vary between groups (clusters) of observations (see Wooldridge, 2003). We consider two cases: either
the sample is clusterized by country, or it is clusterized by income class. As expected, squared errors are
much larger and many variables are no longer signicant. The variables FDI/Y and FDI/Y2 do not avoid
this decline in statistical signicance, yet they perform quite well compared to the other regressors. This
strengthens the thesis according to which FDI is a major determinant of the labor shares in developing
countries.
In columns k and l, the ratio of investment to output in the manufacturing sector is replaced with the
aggregate ratio of capital to output. This does not a¤ect the estimates.
TABLE 8a
TABLE 8b
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the impact of FDI on the factor distribution of income in developing countries. We
build on the idea that FDI increase productive heterogeneity within rms acting in the host country.
Foreign rms are more productive, and, in a frictional labor market, only need to pay slightly more than
local competitors to attract workers. This explains why the labor share falls with FDI. At some point,
the magnitude of foreign rms in host activity may become so large that productive heterogeneity starts
going down. The labor share would then increase with FDI. The paper o¤ers a search-theoretic model
that allows to discuss these two e¤ects, and tests the main predictions on aggregate data through xed
e¤ect and system-GMM estimations.
Policy implications of our work are non-ambiguous. Average wage always increases with nancial
openness, whether the labor share increases or not. Workerswelfare improves as a result. In addition,
the negative e¤ects of FDI decline with FDI stock to GDP ratio. The largest e¤ects of FDI on the labor
share arise at early stages of nancial openness. Such negative e¤ects should not be considered at the time
of evaluating the impact of a further increase in nancial openness, unless one is willing to considerably
overestimate them.
We point out a negative relationship between productive heterogeneity and the labor share of income.
This relationship naturally arises in the context of globalization where modern rms can meet technologi-
cally obsolete and under-equipped competitors. However, this also happens in times of rapid technological
change with emerging industries. To some extent, the information revolution and ICT investments may
15Ortega and Rodriguez (2002) run all their regressions with this transformation. The dependent variable is
ln [(1  LS) =LS] rather than LS.
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have contributed to the downward trend in labor shares in OECD countries. We leave this extrapolation
of our paper to future work.
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APPENDIX
 Capital stock K: Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005)
 FDI/Y = Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment stock to GDP
Source: UNCTAD and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for FDI
Data available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip
 FDI/K = Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment stock to total capital stock
Source: UNCTAD and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for FDI
Data available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/data/wp0669.zip
 I/Y = Ratio of Investment to value-added in the manufacturing sector
Source: UNIDO industrial statistics database INSTAD3 2005 ISIC Rev.2
Values lower than 0 have been omitted from the sample
 K/Y = Ratio of total capital stock to total GDP
Source: Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005)
 LS: Labor share = Ratio of wages and salaries to value added (100)
Source: UNIDO industrial statistics database INSTAD3 2005 ISIC Rev.2
 OPENK: Chinn and Ito nancial openness index. Composite index varying between 2.62 (very
open) and -1.75 (close). It is based on four dummy variables reecting the four major categories on
the restrictions on external accounts: presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current
account transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions, requirement of the surrender of
export proceed.
Source: Chinn and Ito (2006)
 OPENT = Ratio of total exports and imports to GDP
Source: World bank. World development indicators 2005
 TG: Technological gap = One - percentage gap between local GDP (PPP) per capita and US GDP
per capita (100)
Source: World bank. World development indicators 2005
 UNR: Unemployment rate = Ratio of unemployed workers to total labor force
Source: World bank. World development indicators 2005
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 List of the countries used in Table 2 (column a): Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina-Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chile, China, China (Hong Kong), China (Macao), Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote dIvoire,
Croatia, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica,
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mex-
ico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federa-
tion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe
 List of the developed countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
United Kingdom, United States of America
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Variables Obs Groups Mean Stand dev Min Max
    Labor share (LS) 1189 94 33.53 13.99 2.23 85.33
Foreign Direct Investment stock
    FDI/GDP (FDI/Y, UNCTAD) 1189 94 20.97 34.45 0 283.61
    FDI/GDP (FDI/Y, LMF) 1392 84 18.35 25.26 0 275.44
    FDI/capital stock (FDI/K, UNCTAD) 940 70 15.33 22.90 0 193.95
    FDI/capital stock (FDI/K, LMF) 1122 67 14.27 16.26 0 147.35
    (FDI/GDP)*TG (UNCTAD) 1189 94 1372.20 1723.43 0 14966.42
    (FDI/GDP)*TG (Lane) 1392 84 1268.63 1297.06 0 8344.61
    (FDI/K)*TG (UNCTAD) 940 70 1120.7 1545.39 0 17714.39
    (FDI/K)*TG (Lane) 1122 67 1068.71 1079.49 0 6399.84
Model variables
    Technological gap (TG) 1189 94 78.41 17.44 17.82 98.50
    Unemployment rate (UNR) 646 67 9.05 5.73 1.1 42.2
    Capital output ratio (K/Y) 942 70 1.34 0.53 0.18 3.67
    Investment output ratio (I/Y) 855 78 0.28 0.45 -0.174 5.23
Globalization variables
    Trade openness index (OPENT)) 1163 93 75.53 47.69 6.32 294.65
    Financial openness index (OPENK) 1113 88 -0.32 1.32 -1.75 2.62
   Crisis dummy 1083 86 0.18 0.38 0 1
For sources and/or calculations see Appendix.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in regressions
Specification (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
FDI/Y -0.219*** -0.147*** -0.230*** -0.266***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.033) (0.052)
(FDI/Y)² 0.00076*** 0.00048*** 0.00065*** 0.00072***
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00014)
FDI/Y*TG -0.0034*** -0.0049***
(0.00051) (0.00089)
(FDI/Y)²*TG 9.56e-06*** 0.000013***
(1.65e-06) (2.36e-06)
TG -0.108 -0.207*** -0.341*** -0.229*** -0.216*** -0.010
(0.072) (0.069) (0.073) (0.076) (0.074) (0.078)
I/Y 0.726 4.781* 0.797 4.991**
(0.613) (2.596) (0.610) (2.540)
UNR -0.633*** -0.758***
(0.158) (0.166)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.048 0.179 0.269 0.323 0.272 0.338
No observations 1189 1051 775 445 775 445
No countries 94 87 73 52 73 52
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
In regressions b to f, all regressors are one-period lagged.
Table 3: In search for outliers
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Specification 95 percentile 90 percentile FDI/Y<100 FDI/Y<75 TG>50
FDI/Y -0.194*** -0.187*** -0.364*** -0.304*** -0.277***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.086) (0.096) (0.047)
(FDI/Y)² 0.00053*** 0.00051*** 0.0020** 0.00096 0.00077***
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00090) (0.0011) (0.00012)
TG -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.351*** -0.386*** -0.438***
(0.084) (0.079) (0.075) (0.082) (0.082)
I/Y 0.263 0.017 0.664 0.665 0.508
(0.677) (0.658) (0.624) (0.625) (0.644)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.265 0.290 0.269 0.274 0.324
No observations 637 604 747 734 701
No countries 65 65 72 72 69
Notes: Robust standard in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All regressors are one-period lagged. 
For columns a and b, we compute the distribution of % change in LS.
We then omit the observations corresponding to the top 5% and top 10% of such a distribution.
Table 2: Fixed effects regressions
Table 4: Accounting for endogeneity and autocorrelation
(a)  (b) (c) (d) (f) (g) (h)
Specification endogenous endogenous endogenous endogenous predetermined predetermined FE
LS-1 0.667*** 0.719*** 0.713*** 0.635*** 0.722*** 0.652***
(0.087) (0.101) (0.112) (0.093) (0.077) (0.090)
FDI/Y -0.104** -0.107** -0.110** -0.150** -0.085** -0.187** -0.208***
(0.051) (0.046) (0.050) (0.070) (0.039) (0.077) (0.038)
FDI/Y² 0.00023* 0.00023** 0.00024** 0.00028* 0.00022 0.00033* 0.00057***
(0.00013) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00014) (0.00012) (0.00018) (0.00011)
TG -0.192*** -0.158*** -0.156** -0.236*** -0.149*** -0.250*** -0.361***
(0.049) (0.059) (0.061) (0.071) (0.042) (0.071) (0.062)
I/Y 0.520 0.223 -0.077 0.339 -0.444 -1.007 0.801
(0.956) (1.183) (1.103) (1.108) (0.699) (0.898) (0.644)
No observations 735 735 735 735 735 735 641
No countries 67 67 67 67 67 67 65
Sargan 0.056 0.326 0.509 0.726 0.095 0.533
Hansen 0.579 0.083 0.618 0.966 0.550 0.932
AR(2) 0.545 0.575 0.574 0.595 0.501 0.548
No instruments 69 36 21 12 69 12
Lags (2  max) (2  11) (2  6) (2 3) (2 max) (2 3)
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Columns a to f report two-step system-GMM estimates with robust standard errors in brackets. In a to e, FDI/Y and FDI/Y² are considered exogenous.
They are supposed predetermined in f. The set of instruments contains levels and differences of the specified lags of the various endogenous regressors,
and levels and differences of exogenous explicatives. Estimations have been achieved using the Stata command xtabond2.
The number of GMM-style instruments has been reduced using the option collapse.
Lines Sargan and Hansen provide the P-values for the Sargan and Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions.
The null is that instruments are not correlated with the residuals.
Line AR(2) is the P-value for the Arellano-Bond second-order auto-correlation test.
The null is that errors in the difference regression do not exhibit second-order correlation.
Lags' indicates the range of lags that has been considered for the endogenous variables. The first figure is the first lag, and the second figure is the last lag.
Column h reports the estimates of a standard fixed-effect regression on the subsample data effectively used by system-GMM estimates.
Specification (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
FDI/Y -0.230*** -0.238*** -0.247*** -0.274*** -0.277***
(0.033) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) (0.070)
(FDI/Y)² 0.00065*** 0.00069*** 0.00071*** 0.00078*** 0.00079***
(0.00010) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00018)
TG -0.341*** -0.400*** -0.398*** -0.293*** -0.291***
(0.073) (0.078) (0.093) (0.088) (0.099)
I/Y 0.726 1.271* 1.330* 0.935 8.455**
(0.613) (0.713) (0.717) (0.759) (3.743)
OPENK 1.458*** 1.385*** 0.759* 0.350
(0.369) (0.384) (0.392) (0.503)
OPENT -0.010 0.0097 -0.013
(0.023) (0.023) (0.029)
CRISIS -3.020*** -4.383***
(0.837) (1.096)
UNR -0.571***
(0.182)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.269 0.284 0.285 0.289 0.376
No observations 775 723 699 649 373
No countries 73 69 68 64 43
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All regressors are one-period lagged.
Table 5: Globalization
Table 6: Changes in FDI variable
Specification (a)  (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Data UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF
FDI/Y -0.274*** -0.205*** -0.277*** -0.259***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.070) (0.072)
(FDI/Y)² 0.00078*** 0.00059*** 0.00079*** 0.00069***
(0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00018) (0.00020)
FDI/K -0.507*** -0.385*** -0.486*** -0.486***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.085) (0.119)
(FDI/K)² 0.0022*** 0.0017*** 0.0020*** 0.0020***
(0.00028) (0.00040) (0.00033) (0.00060)
TG -0.293*** -0.362*** -0.296*** -0.414*** -0.291*** -0.424*** -0.294*** -0.486***
(0.088) (0.071) (0.096) (0.086) (0.099) (0.103) (0.106) (0.116)
I/Y 0.935 1.018 1.432* 1.159 8.455** 4.116 12.574*** 5.332
(0.759) (0.702) (0.863) (0.756) (3.743) (3.292) (4.786) (4.975)
OPENK 0.759* 0.124 0.669* 0.031 0.350 0.601 0.360 0.670
(0.392) (0.356) (0.390) (0.370) (0.503) (0.496) (0.519) (0.522)
OPENT 0.0097 -0.028 0.0088 -0.023 -0.013 0.029 -0.031 0.034
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
CRISIS -3.020*** -3.885*** -2.934*** -3.970*** -4.383*** -4.474*** -4.126*** -4.071***
(0.837) (0.874) (0.851) (0.890) (1.096) (1.194) (1.039) (1.173)
UNR -0.571*** -0.340** -0.596*** -0.403**
(0.182) (0.161) (0.182) (0.166)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.289 0.247 0.323 0.260 0.376 0.312 0.443 0.367
No observations 649 763 557 662 373 373 340 340
No countries 64 60 53 50 43 42 39 38
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All regressors are one-period lagged.
Table 7a: Sensitivity analysis with FDI/Y and without the unemployment rate
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Specification Developed Developed 4-year 4-year Probit Probit cluster 1 cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 2 K/Y K/Y
Data UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF
FDI/Y 0.224 -0.037 -0.316** -0.212 -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.274** -0.205 -0.274** -0.205 -0.263*** -0.152***
(0.368) (0.222) (0.141) (0.225) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.125) (0.128) (0.135) (0.157) (0.056) (0.051)
(FDI/Y)² -0.014 -0.0095 0.0010*** 0.00088 0.000040***0.000031*** 0.00078** 0.00059* 0.00078** 0.00059 0.00082*** 0.00044***
(0.010) (0.0065) (0.00037) (0.00075) (6.76e-06) (7.05e-06) (0.00032) (0.00035) (0.00034) (0.00041) (0.00015) (0.00015)
TG -0.175** 0.042 -0.281 -0.302** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.293 -0.362** -0.293 -0.362*** -0.173* -0.227***
(0.086) (0.039) (0.190) (0.152) (0.0040) (0.0030) (0.196) (0.176) (0.184) (0.088) (0.099) (0.076)
I/Y 23.455*** 21.141*** -0.211 0.238 0.037 0.039 0.935 1.018 0.935 1.018 3.075* -0.669
(6.539) (6.238) (2.443) (2.183) (0.038) (0.035) (1.981) (1.838) (1.481) (1.234) (1.830) (1.322)
OPENK 0.728 1.069** 0.881 -0.574 0.046** 0.021 0.759 0.124 0.759 0.124 0.871** -0.014
(0.765) (0.535) (1.306) (0.949) (0.021) (0.019) (0.601) (0.448) (0.825) (0.433) (0.378) (0.323)
OPENT -0.172* -0.097 0.012 0.054 0.00059 -0.00084 0.0097 -0.028 0.0097 -0.028 -0.0086 -0.048**
(0.094) (0.060) (0.051) (0.090) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.041) (0.057) (0.051) (0.080) (0.021) (0.020)
CRISIS 1.000 0.746 -6.963** -5.190* -0.133*** -0.183*** -3.020*** -3.885** -3.020** -3.885** -2.932*** -3.706***
(2.358) (2.240) (2.880) (2.814) (0.044) (0.044) (1.064) (1.539) (1.300) (1.816) (0.766) (0.753)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.361 0.350 0.443 0.349 0.301 0.270 0.289 0.247 0.289 0.247 0.234 0.195
No observations 258 336 123 140 649 763 649 763 649 763 748 924
No countries 20 19 48 48 64 60 64 60 64 60 64 62
Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e.
Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980.
Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable.
Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class. 
Table 7b: Sensitivity analysis with FDI/Y and with unemployment rate
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Specification Developed Developed 4-year 4-year Probit Probit cluster 1 cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 2 K/Y K/Y
Data UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF
FDI/Y 0.123 -0.320 -0.094 -0.145 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.277* -0.259 -0.277 -0.259 -0.210*** -0.182**
(0.325) (0.267) (0.180) (0.231) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.166) (0.162) (0.175) (0.227) (0.066) (0.074)
(FDI/Y)² -0.010 -0.0024 0.00035 0.00037 0.000036***0.000031*** 0.00079* 0.00069 0.00079* 0.00069 0.00066*** 0.00044**
(0.0090) (0.0066) (0.00053) (0.00073) (8.54e-06) (8.87e-06) (0.00043) (0.00045) (0.00045) (0.00060) (0.00017) (0.00020)
TG -0.237 -0.199 -0.236 -0.332 -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.291 -0.424 -0.291 -0.424 -0.171 -0.295**
(0.164) (0.169) (0.280) (0.281) (0.0048) (0.0052) (0.222) (0.262) (0.262) (0.292) (0.130) (0.128)
I/Y 37.257** 35.597** 52.689*** 44.72*** 0.350* 0.159 8.455 4.116 8.455** 4.116 2.515 -1.665
(16.292) (16.252) (15.005) (16.69) (0.179) (0.172) (5.473) (5.670) (3.586) (7.851) (2.797) (2.135)
OPENK 1.280 1.347 1.955 1.811 0.030 0.041 0.350 0.601 0.350 0.601 0.471 0.394
(0.897) (0.899) (2.015) (2.219) (0.030) (0.030) (0.675) (0.600) (0.633) (0.530)) (0.501) (0.491)
OPENT -0.320*** -0.265*** 0.0088 0.061 -0.00029 0.0016 -0.013 0.029 -0.013 0.029 0.0064 0.020
(0.093) (0.093) (0.057) (0.101) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.048) (0.054) (0.050) (0.081) (0.027) (0.028)
CRISIS 1.639 1.141 -9.543* -7.618* -0.206*** -0.210*** -4.383*** -4.474** -4.383*** -4.474*** -4.684*** -4.309***
(2.664) (2.615) (5.266) (4.355) (0.058) (0.062) (1.574) (1.898) (1.262) (1.078) (1.073) (1.117)
UNR 0.703** 0.688* -0.242 -0.094 -0.026*** -0.017** -0.571** -0.340 -0.571 -0.340 -0.371** -0.089
(0.357) (0.359) (0.536) (0.414) (0.026) (0.0079) (0.280) (0.264) (0.357) (0.221) (0.166) (0.147)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.327 0.342 0.673 0.512 0.372 0.308 0.376 0.312 0.376 0.461 0.252 0.203
No observations 224 223 57 57 373 373 373 373 373 373 429 428
No countries 20 19 22 21 43 42 43 42 43 42 44 43
Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e.
Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980.
Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable.
Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class. 
Table 8a: Sensitivity analysis with FDI/K and without unemployment rate
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Specification Developed Developed 4-year 4-year Probit Probit cluster 1 cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 2 K/Y K/Y
Data UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF
FDI/K 2.845*** -0.244 -0.536*** -0.467** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.507*** -0.385*** -0.507*** -0.385** -0.446*** -0.318***
(1.071) (0.436) (0.153) (0.211) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.188) (0.142) (0.158) (0.156) (0.068) (0.061)
(FDI/K)² -0.253*** -0.032 0.0025*** 0.0029** 0.000099***0.000075*** 0.0022*** 0.0017** 0.0022*** 0.0017*** 0.0021*** 0.0012**
(0.077) (0.026) (0.00058) (0.0014) (0.000012) (0.000019) (0.00071) (0.00060) (0.00057) (0.00054) (0.00028) (0.00042)
TG -0.264** -0.129 -0.265 -0.290* -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.296 -0.414* -0.296 -0.414*** -0.192** -0.268***
(0.129) (0.093) (0.198) (0.175) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.223) (0.227) (0.250) (0.151) (0.095) (0.075)
I/Y 8.331 16.085 -0.458 -0.283 0.058 0.048 1.432 1.159 1.432 1.159 1.177 -2.193*
(11.366) (10.338) (1.999) (1.771) (0.043) (0.039) (2.353) (1.965) (1.893) (1.445) (1.819) (1.299)
OPENK 0.614 1.311** 0.923 -0.382 0.040* 0.013 0.669 0.031 0.669 0.031 0.830** -0.062
(0.766) (0.565) (1.234) (0.958) (0.022) (0.020) (0.606) (0.499) (0.802) (0.532) (0.368) (0.321)
OPENT -0.272*** -0.078 0.014 0.017 0.00068 -0.00072 0.0088 -0.023 0.0088 -0.023 0.000065 -0.031*
(0.089) (0.063) (0.047) (0.089) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.045) (0.055) (0.051) (0.085) (0.020) (0.018)
CRISIS 1.623 1.267 -6.892** -5.591** -0.127*** -0.184*** -2.934*** -3.970** -2.934* -3.970** -2.717*** -3.547***
(2.182) (2.138) (2.876) (2.706) (0.046) (0.045) (1.006)) (1.571) (1.585) (1.793) (0.754) (0.735)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.330 0.316 0.505 0.388 0.311 0.261 0.323 0.260 0.323 0.260 0.263 0.224
No observations 229 298 107 123 557 662 557 662 557 662 748 924
No countries 17 17 39 40 53 50 53 50 53 50 64 62
Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e.
Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980.
Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable.
Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class. 
Table 8b: Sensitivity analysis with FDI/K and with unemployment rate
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Specification Developed Developed 4-year 4-year Probit Probit cluster 1 cluster 1 cluster 2 cluster 2 K/Y K/Y
Data UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF UNCTAD LMF
FDI/K 1.915** -0.754 -0.246 -0.259 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.486** -0.486* -0.486*** -0.486 -0.420*** -0.405***
(0.929) (0.557) (0.220) (0.375) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.207) (0.250) (0.184) (0.308) (0.080) (0.122)
(FDI/K)² -0.180*** -0.0020 0.0012 0.00084 0.000092***0.000093*** 0.0020*** 0.0020* 0.0020*** 0.0020* 0.0020*** 0.0015**
(0.068) (0.027) (0.0010) (0.0021) (0.000015) (0.000028) (0.00077) (0.0011) (0.00064) (0.0012) (0.00033) (0.00064)
TG -0.446*** -0.365** -0.201 -0.311 -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.294 -0.486 -0.294 -0.486 -0.179 -0.336***
(0.160) (0.168) (0.288) (0.277) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.245) (0.314) (0.331) (0.347) (0.127) (0.127)
I/Y 16.463 28.892* 49.865*** 40.735** 0.519** 0.206 12.574* 5.332 12.574 5.332 1.521 -3.068
(16.124) (16.109) (15.761) (16.012) (0.235) (0.262) (6.860) (7.743) (7.761) (13.186) (2.749) (2.125)
OPENK 1.191 1.578* 2.092 1.719 0.031 0.045 0.360 0.670 0.360 0.670 0.401 0.471
(0.842) (0.893) (2.040) (2.138) (0.031) (0.031) (0.659) (0.701) (0.589) (0.719) (0.487) (0.491)
OPENT -0.300*** -0.210** -0.0045 0.089 -0.00099 0.0018 -0.031 0.034 -0.031 0.034 0.0053 0.034
(0.089) (0.094) (0.058) (0.101) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.052) (0.058) (0.052) (0.077) (0.026) (0.027)
CRISIS 1.356 0.919 -8.903* -7.301* -0.198*** -0.194*** -4.126*** -4.071** -4.126*** -4.071*** -4.521*** -3.985***
(2.577) (2.600) (5.187) (4.240) (0.057) (0.062) (1.336) (1.742) (0.212) (0.1.243) (1.016) (1.066)
UNR 0.770** 0.775** -0.342 0.089 -0.027*** -0.021** -0.596** -0.403 -0.596 -0.403 -0.343** -0.090
(0.313) (0.358) (0.521) (0.419) (0.0086) (0.0083) (0.287) (0.297) (0.383) (0.283) (0.164) (0.147)
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.354 0.350 0.774 0.538 0.422 0.349 0.443 0.367 0.443 0.509 0.290 0.240
No observations 216 216 53 53 340 340 340 340 340 276 429 428
No countries 17 17 19 19 39 38 39 38 39 34 44 43
Robust standard errors in brackets unless specified. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressors are one-period lagged, but columns d and e.
Developed means that the sample only contains countries whose GDP per capita was larger than 60% of the US one in 1980.
Probit means that we consider a logistic transform of the dependent variable.
Columns g to j feature clusterized estimates. 'cluster 1' means that each country is a cluster, while 'cluster 2' means that the sample is clusterized by income class. 
